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Abstract
The paper uses the paradigms of the New Institutional Economics to
quantify a linear optimal choice model to design perspective
institutional clusters for a national economy. This model uses binary
integer institutional choice variables and structural parameter values
based on subjective probabilities collected from experts by calibration
questionnaires.
The optimisation goal may be e.g. a high expected probability of
stable national economic performance under socio-economic
development-credibility constraints, dependent on the realisation of
prospective significant events. The model may be useful as a
complementary tool for the social design of the effective institutional
structure, and especially for evaluation of the socially optimal values
of co-ordinating shadow prices and implementing side-payments in
the political institutional design game.
We use the Estonian case as an example.  The model variables
and data calibration table illustrations are provided mainly to
demonstrate the broad spectre of issues that may be involved in this
analysis.
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1. Introduction and General Methodology
Recent work has yielded robust mechanisms for the implementation of
various choice rules and for different sets of agents. For example, a
recent paper by Eliaz (2002) explores the question of robust
implementation  when the social planner is facing a limited number of
agents who have a potential to err in their activities or being faulty etc.
A very well-known and powerful instrument of enhancing
implementation robustness is the side-payment system or
implementing transfers by social planner (Matsushima, 1993) but here
of the computation of the correct values of these side payments may
be complicated, especially when the choice rules are not
“mathematically nice”. The implementation models of institutional
designs or structures certainly belong to the latter class of problems.
These design models necessarily contain, among other things, binary
choices, integer variables etc.
The reviews of literature in this field (the New Institutional
Economics) are given in e.g. Voigt and Engerer (2002) and some titles
of the latest works that have been seminal for our study are included
in the References but the results of these theoretical studies are not
explicitly reiterated in this more or less applications-oriented paper.
In this paper, a stylised linear planning (LP) model has been
synthetically created to analyse the problems of implementation of
optimal institutional structure for the economic sector. This is a
3simplified version of the more general, conceptual, national social
planner economic design model (in Ennuste, 2001, p. 332, formulae
(1)).
This LP model may be a rational means of study in the cases
where there are numerous institutional changes taking place for the
national economy and the impacts of these changes may be closely
interconnected and there are the conditions of complementarities of
the institutions.
The implicitly conceptual logic behind the model is that the
higher the expected prospective economic credibility is (or the less
uncertainty there will be in the economy), then the more effective the
prospective economic development.
We assume that the prospective quantity or magnitude of
economic credibility may be modelled by a collection of proxy
indicators.  The values of these proxies will depend heavily on the
prospective institutional structures of the economy that will mainly
reduce the uncertainties connected with economic transactions,
incentives, confidences, reduce impacts of shocks etc. The purpose of
this model is to specify the optimal prospective institutional structure
for the economy among possible structure clusters based on the values
of some proxy indicators of economic credibility and the quantitative
relationship between credibility indicators and institutional
characteristics.
It is also important to model the institutional interaction
phenomenon, e.g. introducing some new institutional elements may
introduce also some additional supporting institutional arrangements
or initial conditions (Saint-Paul, 2002, has named this as restricted
local optima principle).
By Optimal institutional structure, we mean the structure that
will prospectively maximise the quantified value of the indicator that
is chosen as proxy for institutional credibility of the economy, and
also satisfy some quantitatively expressed constraints. For example,
we may institutionally maximise the stability t of prospective
economic development (e.g.: t=q/s, where q describes e.g. average
quantity of national income and s models standard deviation etc.)
subject to a constraint that more than a given level of price stability
should be guaranteed etc. The expected impact (“output”) of the
prospective existence of structural elements is conceptually modelled
by the expected effects or outputs.  It is assumed that these element’s
outputs add linearly to the overall credibility of the indicator.
As it is extremely complicated to quantify the named expected
effects by their real values, as the experts have no experiences
4regarding alternative institutions or about old institutions in the new
environments. Therefore, first, we suggest that the experts calibrate
the parameters by adjusting the values with the mainstream research
results in this field such as is done in the engineering approach (Roth,
2002; Ledyard and Palfrey, 1999).
Second, to make the task of quantification even more convenient,
we suggest approximate input-output parameter values by
comparative probability values. In the last case, we base parameters
on the present institutional structural elements (status quo). The output
parameters of the perspective institutional elements are probability
estimates (or their intervals) indicating that these elements will
expectedly be more effective than the basic institutional element.
Basing all the future comparisons on the present or the prior
institutions makes the calibration estimates hopefully more reliable as
some present institutional effects may be quantified statistically e.g. as
parameters of linear regressions (Rajasalu, 2002). Also by basing
comparisons on the present institutions, we take into consideration the
importance of prior existence of many implicitly involved institutions
such as language etc. (Hodgson, 1998 and 2002).
This model may be useful as one tool in the “political market
game” of effective institutional structure design, and particularly for
the evaluation of the values of co-ordinating shadow prices in the
political institutional design game. In other words, this model may
give some macro approaches and co-ordinating parameters for
stimulating micro calculations in institutional design (Brekke and
Moxnes, 2002, and Ennuste, 2001). By introducing correlated agents
and relevant side-payment systems, we overcome the implementation
problem (the problem of collecting un-manipulated information from
the agents) (Aoyagi, 1998).
As of yet, There is no standard definition of institutions (Voigt
and Engerer, 2002). In our model, we take a broad approach to
defining economic institutions: devices and arrangements that co-
ordinate the economic interactions and shape economic decisions by
reducing economic interaction and co-ordination uncertainties (North,
1998). Or in other words, economic institutions are devices to enhance
the credibility of economic transactions and create confidence in
economic activities.
This paper models the institutions on micro-, meso- and macro-
levels (Yu, 2001) including both internal and external institutions
(Voigt and Engerer, 2002) and individual and public institutions. We
also distinguish formalised (de jure) and unformalised (de facto)
institutions. For example, the monetary system belongs to the set of
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institutional alternatives include efficient public goods mechanisms
versus their simplified approximations by national voting referenda
(Ledyard and Palfrey, 2002). On the other hand, for instance, the
reputation climate within a firm belongs to the set of internal micro-
level individual or local institutions while the market organisation
form (e.g. monopoly) of the firm belongs to the set of external
formalised de facto institutions and the legal status of the state
language is a de jure public external institution etc.
2. Technical-Methodological Remarks
As according to our previously stated assumptions, institutional
structures are intended to enhance the credibility of economic
interactions. We therefore use indicators or proxies that are important
for forming credibility estimates and affecting institutions as
maximands and constraints. In our model, the indicators used for
initial factor-components or proxies for the synthetic economic
confidence indicators (Laven and Perotti, 2001) include stable
economic development, trade balance, attraction of foreign direct
investments, and good access to capital markets. According to our
approach the high economic credibility is in turn the main determinant
of good industrial performance.
The structural parameters of the perspective design model should
be based on deductive reasoning and therefore in essence the experts’
subjective a priory probabilistic data (based of course on econometric
studies). As for the experts, the most convenient way for them to
model data in this “institutional accounting” may be to estimate
subjective probabilities. Therefore, we model the structural parameters
as probabilities, and with these simple questions we may avoid the
phenomenon of pragmatic overconfidence of experts (Hvide, 2002)
that may be a danger in the institutional analysis.
We set up this model as a linear planning model (additive
effects) with binary integer (1; 0) decision variables.  This could also
be termed an optimal constraint choice model, or a design model. We
take the target function (social maximand) and constraints here as
linear combinations and all structural (input-output) parameters
estimated by the experts are taken as descriptions of probabilities
(possibly with interval distributions).
Namely: 1) for example, the probability of prospective good
credibility can be adequately modelled as a sum of weighted
6credibility indicators of economic activities, where the weights are
based on the volumes of activities or other factors, 2) the probabilities
of good credibility of certain activities can be easily estimated as
dependent on certain institutional arrangements in the economy, and
3) in these probability estimates, prospective economic recession and
crises can be taken into consideration.
It is important to note that if multiplicative effects of activities or
arrangements are considered initially in the model, the logarithmic
transformation allows us again to reduce the model to the linear form.
The optimisation vector denotes various alternative economic
institutions applied by economic organisations and companies. Here
we differentiate between two kind of institutions: 1) public institutions
which have the impact on the overall economy and work through
governmental legislation and other organisations and 2) individual or
local non-public (e.g. company, municipality etc.) institutions
implemented by companies and municipalities for themselves and
effective only in the same company and municipality etc.
The target function is a linear combination of the optimisation
vector which maximises the average weighted probability of high
national economic performance (e.g. economic growth). The
constraint inequalities are linear combinations of weighted
probabilities of certain socio-economic development effects
(“outputs”) that should in sum be not less than certain specified levels.
Certain constraints of the model contain also institutional “in-puts”:
for the implementation of certain institutional arrangements there is
the need for existence of certain public institutional arrangements.
Here we assume the set of constraints may have different
parameter values dependent on the realisation of the states of nature in
perspective (e.g. national economy will be member of the EU or
alternatively will not be member) with the given probabilities. This
enables the model to apply to a variety of circumstances, both now
and in the future. Note that the values of parameters of the target
function may vary according to the realisation of prospective events.
It is important to note also that the proxies of the Lagrangean
solutions of this model may be used by social planners as co-
ordinating indicators (shadow prices and optimal side-payments, e.g.
Matsushima, 1993, etc.) for design and implementation of an optimal
institutional structures in a co-ordinated game form.
The paper is organised as follows. In the third section, we
describe the framework of the model. Next we give an abstract
example. The paper concludes with an experimental Estonian case
study of the prospective partial optimal national economic design and
7conclusions. We also provide an illustrative table form for collecting
experts’ calibration data for the model.
3. Set-up
In this paper, we consider only the optimisation of the institutional
aspect or economic institutional structure x=(xj), j? N=(1,… ,n) ceteris
paribus and abstract away optimisation of other aspects (e.g.
intensities of economic activities, technological structure etc.). We
take these other activities as given exogenously with optimal
intensities.  2) In this model, we make an optimal choice of optimal
institutional structure and model this by describing the co-ordinate
variable values xj by binary digits 1 or 0, where 1 denotes the choice
or enforcing xj type of institution, and 0 rejecting xj type. 3)
Institutional effects on the national socio-economic development
probabilities are here assumed to be additive (linear combinations)
and the chosen institutional structure x should satisfy the given linear
constraint system Ax=b, where A=( xij), i? M=(1,… ,m); j? N is
institutional “input-output” matrix where element xjj describes the
additive impact of application of institution xj (e.g. progressive income
tax system) on the value of the national socio-economic development
indicator (e.g. average weighted probability of avoiding national
economic failure). The constraint vector b=( bi), i? M is the vector of
the external limiting constraint values of socio-economic indicators
for the economy. 4) Note that the triple {x,A,b} may contain also
“technical” elements to model the constraints like e.g. x1+x2=11 e.g.
to model that x1 and x2 are alternatives. 5) The target indicator of the
model is functional cx, where vector c=(cj), j? N and co-ordinate cj is
the impact value (weighted probability) of institutional choice xj on
the target indicator (e.g. the probability of the growth of national
economy).
And, last but not least, there should be in the model a constraint
to avoid too many institutional adjustments and changes to build
stable expectations (Voigt and Engerer, 2002) and credible
institutional evolution.
4. Some Solution and Calibration Notes
Implicitly we consider a two-stage model. At the first stage, a
structure of x is fixed (“here and now”). At the second stage, this
8structure must meet a certain set of alternative constraints based on
certain events (e.g. constraints in the case of EU membership, in the
case of staying out of the EU etc.) and maximise the expected value of
the target function. For simplification, we do not consider possibility
of corrective (“wait and see”) xj type activities in the second stage.
Note that the probabilities of realisations of certain events are used for
the calculation of the expected values of target function coefficients.
The initial values of the model parameters calibrated by the
opinions of experts are asked in the form of intervals (e.g. aij =(aijl ,
aijh) where letter l denotes lower value of the estimate and h denotes
higher value of the estimate).
The use of intervals makes the calibration more convenient and
the range of the estimation intervals gives some information on
uncertainties connected with the parameters of the model. The interval
setting also enables us to perform sensitivity analysis and the elements
of the “wait and see” solution approach can be evaluated. Namely, by
random selection of the point values of parameters from the intervals,
it is possible to formulate numerous random collections of the point
parameters of the model.  We are then able to produce numerous
optimal x structures based on combinations of possible parameter
values. Analysis of the variations of these structures may give some
additional information for the social institutional designer.
In the mechanism constructed, the social planner is required to
disseminate 1) the shadow cost system to achieve the allocative
efficiency and 2) the side payments system for the truth telling to the
agents. The agents are required to reveal their direct estimates of
input-output quantities.
5. Illustrative Specification Example and Discussions for
Estonian Case Studies
For illustration, we present a reduced example of that specification of
model for the partial economic institutional system of the Estonian
economy. This partial specification demonstrates the very broad
spectre of issues that may be studied using this approach. The
specification of the optimisation vector of the partial institutional
structure x, the constraint vector b, input-output matrix A and
objective function parameter vector c in this illustration mainly reflect
the present Estonian transformational socio-economic institutional
issues. The experimental solution is based only on point estimates.
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variables in the linear programming problem is as follows: x=(x1, x2,
…  ,x17) is the set X of n=17 dimensional integer co-ordinate values
(0;1). In the following Table,- the vector of constraint constants is
presented b=(b1, b2, …  ,b76) in the set E76, m=76. In this vector, the
first 38 co-ordinates are the constraint values reflecting a situation that
would occur if Estonia were to miss the first accession wave into the
EU in 3 years or so (situation C1), and the next 38 constraints belong
to a situation where Estonia takes part in the first wave of accession
and becomes a member of the EU in 3-4 years (C2 situation). In
addition to the 76 essential constraints, there are also several technical
solution constraints, denoted as +.
Matrix A of the institutional input-output has nxm+ elements, and
c is a given vector in E17. The dual problem variables (Lagrange
multipliers) vector was denoted as y=(y1, y2, .. ,y26) in the space E76+.
Note here that vector c elements (co-ordinates) follow the names of
vector x elements and the elements of the matrix A obtain their names
as elements in the set defined by names of the elements of vectors x
and b.
The specific characteristics of the 17 choice variables (0;1) in the
experimental model are  described as follows:
x1 - Estonian language as single official state language;
x2 - changes in the laws to make the Russian legally another state
language (the relevant formalised technical constraint of
alternativeness for x1 and x2 is: x1+x2=1);
x3 - present flat personal income tax;
x4 - progressive personal income tax (x3+x4=1);
x5 - present company income tax on distributed profit only;
x6 - company income tax on gross profit (x5+x6=1);
x7 - kroon as the single national legal tender will stay;
x8 - two parallel national legal tenders will be implemented:
kroon and euro (x7+x8=1);
x9 - national stock exchange as autonomous company;
x10 - national stock exchange affiliated with the Finnish
counterpart (x9+x10=1);
x11 - national electric generating system as state monopoly in the
closed market as it is now;
x12 - the same system but in the open market;
x13 - disintegrated privatised monopoly in the open market
(x11+x12+x13=1);
x14 - present monopoly price regulations by the state will stay;
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x15 - new amended more effective monopoly price regulations
(x14+x15=1);
x16 - status quo corporal party policy (partocracy) system in
national socio-economic decision making will prevail;
x17 - shift in election and governmental laws towards civic
society rules in socio-economic decision making based on more
technocratic principles and national referendums (x16+x17=1).
The institutional characteristics and names of the essential
constraint vector elements were formulated according to the following
Table-Form indicators and two times in succession: first C1 and then
C2 state.  The first indictor is the objective function so we start with
the second indicator.
Table-Form
(Probability %)
Alternative institutional variants
Status quo New
alter.1
New
alter.2
Prospective events
          Input-output indicators
C1         C2 C1     C2 C1   C2
In the economic sphere (E)
1.  Higher stability of  economic
development
2.  More stable employment
3.  Improvement of trade balance
4.  Higher attraction of foreign direct
investments
5.  Bigger inflow of portfolio investments
6.  Better access to international capital
markets
7.  Better ratio of financial reserves/budget
8.  Stable prices
9.  Stable interest rates
10. Stable currency
............................
In the social sphere (S)
1.  Lower value of Gini coefficient
2.  Improvement of average ratio of
pensions/salaries
3.  Improvement of unemployment support
4.  Stronger penalties for late payments
5.  Increase of education expenditure
.........
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In socio-economic transactions sphere (T)
1.  Better tax legislation
2.  Better labour legislation
3.  Better social insurance legislation
4.  Stronger penalties for late payments
5.  Stronger penalties for breach of
contracts
6.  Better protection of property rights
7.  Better enforcement of contracts
8.  More rigorous regulation of monopolies
.............
Inputs (“consumption”) of all-national and
other complementary institutional designs
(tick the necessary) (M)
1.  Member of the EMU
2.  Zero investment tax
3.  Proportional income tax
4.  Progressive income tax
5.  Better social security system
6.  Stronger penalty systems for breach of
economic regulations
7.  Better monopoly regulations
.......
The probabilities of the states C1 and C2 to realise were e.g.
estimated to be 25% and 75% respectively, and the average expected
values of the vector c elements were weighted according to these
probabilities. The matrix A elements have been estimated by experts
experimentally and one example of the initial estimation data for one
economic institutional activity is given in Appendix B. All the
activities were given the same significance factors and accordingly the
weighting coefficients of all columns of the preliminary matrix A and
vector c got the same value –(1) in this example. Vector b elements
were all the same for the C1 situation - 60%, and for C2 - 70%,
meaning that membership in the EU demands a greater probability of
the realisation of higher institutional effectiveness.
6.   Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to specify a quantifiable linear
planning model for the design and implementation of an optimal
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institutional structure for an economic sector of a country.
In this model, the choice variables denote alternative institutional
arrangements and the objective function and constraints are mainly
focused on modelling economic credibility and stability. These are the
indicators that are the main targets institutional designs.
The structural parameters of this model in their content are
markedly different from the typical macroeconomic models where
direct input-output effects are described. Here, the structural
parameters describe probabilities that the given institutional
alternatives will have the prospective better effects than the currently
implemented alternatives would have in the future. These types of
parameters are most convenient for the experts to quantify as
subjective probabilities. Experiments suggested that, in the case of
interval estimates, there is not much danger to quantify experts’
pragmatic overconfidence.
From the modelling aspect, the model has binary integer
institutional choice variables and the numerical values of the structural
parameters are subjective probabilities given by expert questionnaires.
This paper demonstrates that the application of a linear planning
model for institutional design should help to arrange and systematise
the lines of reasoning in this field and to quantify the mysterious
effects of institutional arrangements. Therefore, the presented model
may be a useful complementary tool in the design of national
industrial institutional structures. By moving from the results of this
type of macro-models to the complicated micro-economic “political
market games”, we may have a better understanding of how to
socially co-ordinate these games in a more positive direction.
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